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Abstract 
 
Unlike other classics of political economy, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” (EVL) has not sparked 
many innovations in the field of electoral studies. This paper aims to demonstrate that 
scholars miss out on a powerful theory of political behaviour by leaving Hirschman’s ideas to 
other disciplines. To change this, I resolve several theoretical complications that have 
hampered the application of EVL to democratic elections. On this basis, I construct a model 
of voting behaviour through the electoral cycle to explain typical “second-order” effects in 
elections to the European Parliament (EP). Building on the parameters of EVL allows to unite 
such diverse phenomena as anti-government swings, declining turnout, protest voting, 
conversion and alienation in one theoretical framework. Testing the model with survey data 
from the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004 reveals novel insights into the 
dynamics at work in EP elections. The role of strategic voting in the form of voice appears to 
be limited. Instead, processes of de- and realignment in the form of exit dominate a picture of 
EP elections that undermines the widespread conception of second-order irrelevance. 
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In his “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”, Albert O. Hirschman (1970) outlined a general theory of 
individual behaviour vis-à-vis an organisational environment. In the case of elections, the 
theory combines insights from spatial modelling, elite theories, and the analysis of voting 
behaviour. This approach sheds light on various phenomena that are usually dealt with 
separately, ranging from voter turnout to the mechanics of party systems. Unlike many other 
disciplines, however, electoral research has not often applied Hirschman’s ideas in empirical 
studies. I aim to demonstrate that this neglect is unjustified by applying exit, voice and loyalty 
(EVL) in an analysis of elections to the European Parliament (EP). 
EP elections have long been identified as “second-order” contests with poor levels of 
public interest and campaign mobilisation (Reif & Schmitt 1980). At most, voters and parties 
treat them as test runs for upcoming elections in the national arenas. These features entail the 
typical midterm phenomena of low turnout, losses by national governments and gains by 
small parties. Especially because they are perceived as unimportant by political actors, EP 
elections offer a lot to political scientists who are interested in the logic and contextual 
determinants of voting behaviour. Second-order effects depend on the timing of an EP 
election in a country’s legislative period. They are pronounced at midterm but vanish once 
national elections induce order into electoral competition. Cyclical models of voting 
behaviour serve to capture these revealing dynamics. 
Hirschman’s theoretical approach is best brought to bear in such an environment. Previous 
findings depict widespread continuity of voting behaviour in EP elections that may be 
attributed to the concept of loyalty. Other studies emphasise protest voting against governing 
parties that may be captured by the concept of voice. However, this paper shows that a third 
factor accounts for the general midterm effect: exit. Cyclical variation in turnout and vote 
choice is best explained by conversion from one party to another and by alienation from the 
whole party system. Seen from an EVL perspective, EP elections seem to have many aspects 
beyond being just second-order protest events. 
To corroborate these claims, I will first give an overview over Hirschman’s theory and the 
few innovations it has sparked in electoral research. I then address theoretical issues that 
complicate the application of the theory to voting behaviour. On this basis, I develop a model 
of EVL in EP elections consisting of variables derived directly from Hirschman. The model 
serves to predict how voters choose among several behavioural options in the second-order 
arena. To specify these options empirically, I construct a voter typology of EVL and apply it 
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 to the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004. This allows testing the model by 
multinomial conditional logistic regression. I conclude with several implications of my 
findings for EVL in general and EP elections in particular. 
 
 
The basic model 
 
EVL is a general model at the interface of economics and politics. It describes a market-like 
situation where suppliers compete for a given quantity of consumers. The actors populating 
the model may be firms and customers, organisations and members, States and citizens, or (as 
we will see below) parties and voters. But let us stick to the general terminology of suppliers 
and consumers for the sake of a short refresher. 
The sequence of the model starts at a point where the product offered by a supplier suffers 
a drop in quality. Being faced with incomplete information, the supplier does not learn 
immediately about this lapse. This is only possible by observing the behaviour of consumers. 
Once they recognise the drop in quality, consumers who consider the problem intolerable 
have two options at their disposal. They may switch to another supplier (“exit”) or they may 
tell their supplier to counteract the problem (“voice”). A third, residual option is to remain 
inactive. Consumers’ choices among these options can be explained by a set of factors, each 
of which is based on a comparison of costs and benefits. 
One factor is loyalty. If consumers are loyal to their suppliers they choose the voice option, 
otherwise they choose to exit (contravening one’s loyalty implies psychological costs). A 
second factor is available exit options. Attractive exit options make exit more and voice less 
likely (choosing a less attractive supplier implies opportunity costs). However, consumers 
may also use available exit options in a strategic manner to lend credibility to their voice, 
which reverses the above pattern (highly credible voice may generate maximum benefit).
1 A 
third factor is consumers’ expectations of the influence they may exert on suppliers. High 
expectations make voice more and exit less likely (renouncing effective exercise of influence 
may lead to suboptimal payoff). This completes the basic structure of the model. 
EVL has been applied to all sorts of social phenomena, and Hirschman himself reported 
summaries of these literatures (1974; 1986). But despite the extraordinary status enjoyed by 
EVL since Barry (1978: vi) inscribed the book into the honour role of political economy, a 
                                                 
1 Then again, exit options may be tantamount to veto positions that effectively replace the need for voice 
(Hirschman 1978). In the electoral context, however, no single citizen can be assumed to command a veto. 
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 more recent review of the literature (Dowding et al. 2000) found only two applications in the 
field of party politics, voting behaviour and electoral competition (to use a generous frame): 
Eubank, Gangopadahay & Weinberg (1996) and Kato (1998) use the framework to explain 
the behaviour of Italian party members and Japanese legislators, respectively, during times of 
severe crisis and organisational break-up. One may want to add Wellhofer & Hennessey’s 
(1974) discussion of socialist party strategies in Britain and Germany and Kweit’s (1986) 
study of party activists in the US switching between organisations. However, the explicit case 
of democratic elections has been widely neglected, although Hirschman (1970: 62ff.) devoted 
an entire chapter to electoral competition and saw applications to party politics as “privileged 
topics for the testing and refinement” (1974: 18) of his theory. 
 
 
The electoral context 
 
Only few scholars have applied EVL to voting behaviour in a narrower sense, and several 
theoretical questions remain on the agenda. My first aim is to establish the elements of EVL 
in the electoral context. I will define exit and voice as electoral choices, relate loyalty to party 
identification, interpret exit options in terms of competence and ideology, revisit the 
collective action problem inherent to voice and turnout, and discuss the role of parties as 
supply-side actors. Often we will come to the conclusion that – in line with Hirschman’s 
“possibilistic” approach (Lepenies 2008) – EVL as a model is too rich to be solved by logic 
alone. This then calls for empirical investigation, a task I will turn to in due course. 
 
Exit and Voice 
When it comes to national politics, exit and voice seem to imply grand efforts (cf. Hirschman 
1993). Voice may require public demonstrations or even civil disobedience, and exit may go 
as far as forfeiting one’s citizenship. In working democracies, however, citizens dispose of a 
more basic means of influence: the vote. Most fundamentally, a voter who is dissatisfied with 
the party she usually supports may choose exit and support another party at the polls. In Table 
1, this is represented by conversion, the combination of turnout and exit. 
Besides exit, Kang (2004) argued that the voting act also offers an opportunity for voice. 
Casting a vote for a party other than the one usually supported may be understood as an 
attempt to express dissatisfaction. In Franklin, Niemi & Whitten’s (1994) terminology, voters 
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 engage in “expressive tactical” behaviour to send a signal to their party to alter its political 
course. In Table 1, this is represented by protest voting, the combination of turnout and voice. 
The distinction between protest and conversion is essential. In both cases, the immediate 
observable behaviour is vote switching. However, in the case of voting behaviour more than 
in other domains of EVL it is important to distinguish a formal act from its underlying motive. 
Converts abandon their parties and do not intend to return. Protest voters, however, do not 
consider their behaviour as long-term change. Following Barry (1974), Kang (2004) therefore 
interprets protest voting as “exit-with-voice”: switching parties implies formal exit, but the 
intention is to voice dissatisfaction with the old party, not to reward or stay with another one.
2 
Importantly, different motives have different implications for aggregate election outcomes: 
Protest increases volatility at most, but conversion may cause realignment. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Exit and voice in elections are not restricted to turnout, but may equally work through 
abstention. While Hirschman’s exit basically describes a change of suppliers, exit by 
abstention gained support in Bélanger (2004) and Bélanger & Nadeau (2005) who investigate 
the effect of political disaffection on electoral participation and third-party vote choice. 
General dissatisfaction with party politics may lead to alienation, represented by the 
combination of abstention and exit in Figure 1. In contrast to exit from a particular party 
through conversion, alienation – as already in Downs (1957) – reflects exit from the whole 
party system. The potential consequences of exit therefore extend to dealignment and 
declining turnout. 
Somewhat paradoxically, abstention may also be interpreted as voice. Citizens may 
withhold electoral support from a party to document dissatisfaction with its current 
performance. In elections, action and inaction are not mutually exclusive (cf. Ajambo 2007). 
Non-voting does not necessarily reflect a lack of a certain attitude (like interest, trust, etc.), 
but may also be interpreted as conscious and purposeful behaviour. In Table 1, this is 
represented by “voice-by-silence”, the combination of abstention and voice. 
 
Loyalty 
Loyalty is an attitude that influences the exit-voice decision. Hirschman described it as a “less 
rational, though far from wholly irrational” motive (1970: 38). This hybrid nature arguably 
                                                 
2 Hirschman (1970: 104) already suggested that exit and voice may not be mutually exclusive. 
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 reflects the double function of loyalty as “exit tax” and “voice subsidy” (Gehlbach 2006: 
403). As an exit tax, loyalty keeps voters from deserting their parties even if dissatisfaction is 
high. As a voice subsidy, loyalty animates voters to fight the sources of poor performance and 
malpractice in their parties. Loyalty thus combines two reference points: the organisation that 
profits from voice and the individual itself that would suffer from exit. 
In the electoral context, the concept of party identification comes immediately to mind. 
Tellingly, Pizzorno (1986: 360) interprets Hirschman’s loyalty “as a degree of identification” 
that contributes to self-identity and recognition. Anticipating Pizzorno’s language, Miller 
(1976: 22) saw party ID as giving rise to “an important part of the individual’s self-identity as 
a political actor”. In the classic Michigan study, the terms “identification” and “loyalty” are 
practically used as synonyms (Campbell et al. 1960: e.g. 121). Loyalty and party ID, although 
originating from different theoretical traditions, seem to fulfil similar functions. 
 
Exit options 
Hirschman (1970) refers to the criterion that consumers use to evaluate suppliers as “quality”. 
A basic assumption is that all suppliers produce the same good, but they differ in their ability 
to deliver high quality. In the electoral context, such goods are called valence issues (Stokes 
1963). These are issues where parties and voters generally agree on the desirable outcome of 
policy-making. Voters choose according to the criterion where parties differ – their ascribed 
competence to deliver the desired outcome. The concept of exit options would then be defined 
as the difference in competence between two (or more) parties. 
However, quality is not the only variable representing the attractiveness of exit options in 
EVL. Hirschman (1976) also noted that quality (and its decline) may not be the same for 
everybody. Consumers may disagree what should be considered a high-quality product in the 
first place. In electoral competition, this is the case of positional issues where differences in 
preferences over outcomes supersede differences in competence (Downs 1957). In fact, 
Hirschman (1970: 62ff.) adopted the spatial model of voting behaviour with its positional 
implications to elaborate the logic of EVL in democratic politics. Both valence and position 
seem to be likely candidates for the role of exit options. 
 
Collective action 
In an extensive review article, Barry (1974) scrutinised the logic of Hirschman’s model. One 
of his major objections concerns the collective action problem of voice (cf. Olson 1965). 
Indeed, whereas exit is a clear-cut decision for the individual who enjoys all the benefits and 
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 may even shift part of the costs, stemming organisational decline through voice seems to 
entail costs for the individual but benefits for all members of an organisation. In electoral 
research, the collective action problem has been prominent since Downs’ (1957) statement 
that voting is irrational. A single vote has infinitesimal influence and will virtually never 
decide an election, but the act of voting is costly. Is voice therefore irrational? 
This conclusion would be at odds with the frequency voice is actually exercised in all 
kinds of social situations. Hirschman himself produced two arguments to defend the 
rationality of voice. First, the act of exercising voice to contribute to a public good may in 
itself be rewarding (Hirschman 1974). Second, in the case of disagreement over outcomes 
voice may lead to uniquely individual utility of articulating one’s own specific concerns 
(Hirschman 1976). Laver (1976) added that individuals may even expect a mobilisation effect 
of their own voice on others, and Dowding & John (2008) find evidence for voice (including 
turnout) as collective activity. Voting as voice seems to be defensible on theoretical and 
empirical grounds.
3 
 
The supply side 
Finally, while EVL allows us to derive a set of expectations about voter behaviour, what is the 
role of parties in the model? One may wonder why parties would not immediately adapt to 
whatever form of potential pressure. The original assumption in EVL is that insensitivity 
results from failure to perceive a problem. But insensitivity may also be interpreted as a 
deliberate choice serving specific purposes such as to increase freedom of movement in the 
short run (Hirschman 1970: 124), to buy off individual protesters (Hirschman 1976) or simply 
to exploit citizens (Clark, Golder & Golder 2006). Kolarska & Aldrich (1980) specify that 
such patterns of suppressed responsiveness mostly occur under conditions of restricted 
competition. Conversely, the more competitive an economic or political system is, the sooner 
strategies of insensitivity should be punished through the selection mechanism. 
But even perfect competition does not guarantee perfect results. If competitive party 
systems stimulate exit, this also means loss of constructive critique otherwise available 
through voice. Thus, exit “may lull the parties into the belief that there is no need to re-
examine party positions.” (Kweit 1986: 192f.). On the other hand, high competitiveness may 
also enhance voice because parties under pressure can be expected to listen. A decline in 
quality may not be sufficient for voice if it is not accompanied by the belief that the party 
                                                 
3 Moreover, note that voice in elections does not even require turnout. This is only the case for protest voting, but 
not for “voice-by-silence” which operates through abstention and is thus free of cost. 
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 would be able and willing to reverse it. Overall, these arguments suggest that successful 
parties will at least partially depend on exit and voice as mechanisms of recuperation, but this 
is not irreconcilable with manifold reasons for insensitivity to voters’ demands. 
 
 
EVL in elections to the European Parliament 
 
To observe EVL in voting behaviour, elections to the European Parliament offer an ideal 
environment. Since Reif & Schmitt’s (1980) seminal article, scholars have considered EP 
elections as “second-order” contests. Although they are held concurrently across the EU every 
five years and give rise to a common legislative body, EP elections are primarily of national 
character: national parties stand for election, and national issues dominate the campaigns. 
Even if they resemble national parliamentary elections in these respects, however, the 
institutional frame is different. First and foremost the EP cannot generate a government, and 
its legislative competencies are not (yet) comparable with those of its national counterparts. 
Given the generally low stakes and the importance of domestic politics in EP elections, 
Reif & Schmitt predicted three main differences to national elections: turnout is lower, 
national governing parties lose, and small parties gain. Apart from that, however, voting 
behaviour in EP elections simply mirrors behaviour in national elections. Topics related to 
European integration play only a marginal role. 
The EVL framework lends itself to the analysis of these phenomena. First, previous 
findings highlight the continuity of voting behaviour in EP elections that may be attributed to 
the concept of loyalty (Schmitt & Mannheimer 1991; Caramani 2006). Second, scholars 
emphasise protest voting against governing parties that may be captured by the concept of 
voice (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996). Third, changes in voter support in EP elections have 
been explained by conversion from one party to another that may be described as exit (Heath 
et al. 1996; Marsh 1998; Weber 2007). Although this high degree of correspondence between 
EVL and the second-order model was touched upon in Reif & Schmitt (1980: 10), it has never 
been spelled out. Unfolding this logic is a new contribution to EP elections research and an 
original test case for Hirschman’s theory. 
The second-order model has resulted in a long line of research over three decades. 
Generally supportive results for the EP elections of 1999 and 2004 that are of interest here can 
be found in Ferrara & Weishaupt (2004), Marsh (2005), Schmitt (2005), Freire & Teperoglou 
(2007) and Hix & Marsh (2007). Especially in the face of this success, however, it is striking 
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 that most studies are restricted to aggregate data while the corresponding micro-logic is often 
taken for granted. Although comparing aggregate turnout and party support to national 
elections sheds light on the dynamics at work in EP elections, any conclusions should be 
treated with caution unless the underlying processes can be traced on the basis of individual-
level data (cf. Robinson 1950). I will therefore draw on the voter surveys from the 1999 and 
2004 European Election Studies (EES) to trace the mechanisms of EVL.
4 Based on these data, 
I will identify voters of four types: core voters, protest voters, converts, and alienated voters. 
Core voters stick with their party in several elections. As the above discussion shows, one 
should be cautious with simply equating this form of behaviour with loyalty. Still, most core 
voters are supposed to be bound to their parties in the long run. 
Protest voters temporarily withdraw their support from their preferred party in EP elections 
either by vote switching or by abstention. In EP elections research, this is known under the 
term “voting with the boot” coined by Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996).
5 Note that protest 
voters formally choose exit in EP elections, but the reference point for their behaviour is the 
national arena. EP elections are seen as a means to maximise the impact of one’s preferences 
at home, not in the European arena itself. This motive makes protest voting an expression of 
voice rather than of exit. 
Converts start a lasting preference change in EP elections that extends into the national 
arena. These voters follow a clear-cut exit strategy in Hirschman’s terminology. Even if not 
overly prominent in the literature, conversion is in line with the original second-order model 
that takes “main-arena political change” into account (Reif & Schmitt 1980: 14). 
Alienated voters represent a second type of exit called for by the striking turnout effect in 
EP elections. Alienation can be considered a form of exit not (only) from a particular party 
but (also) from a whole party system. This has important implications: The reference point for 
                                                 
4 See http://www.ees-homepage.net. The EES surveys were conducted across the EU following the EP elections 
of 1999 and 2004. Only Malta was not covered in 2004. Important variables are missing for Northern Ireland 
(both elections) and Belgium, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Sweden (2004). These elections had to be dropped. 
Individual-level cases were double-weighted so each election has the same weight and party support reflects the 
official results of the EP elections. Missing values were imputed using the Amelia II programme for multiple 
imputation (King et al. 2001; Honaker, King & Blackwell 2007). This algorithm was employed to produce five 
imputed datasets, and all calculations were carried out for each of them. The final point estimates and standard 
errors were aggregated as proposed by Rubin (1987). 
5 For Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996), “voting with the boot” would primarily benefit extremist parties. Voice is 
conceptualised somewhat broader and may also be exercised by supporting mainstream opponents. 
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 exit by abstention is not defined in relative terms (“Party A is better than Party B”) but by 
some absolute standard (“neither Party A nor Party B is good enough”). 
 
 
Variables and hypotheses 
 
To explain how voters choose among the options listed above, I will derive independent 
variables from the EVL framework. The first task is to identify how and under which 
circumstances the initial loss of quality in political supply occurs. Here we can draw on one of 
the standard hypotheses of second-order elections research: Reif & Schmitt (1980) proposed 
that the popularity of a government and its performance in EP elections can be modelled as a 
function of the national electoral cycle. Losses should be highest in EP elections around 
midterm and fade towards the beginning and the end of the legislative period. 
Midterm seems to imply some loss of quality that governments supply. As discussed 
above, this phenomenon may be unintended, but one may also rely on systematic explanations 
like strategic management of the economy (Nordhaus 1975) or cyclical variation of campaign 
communication (Weber 2007). In any way, an imperative task is to test whether the frequency 
of exit and voice can be explained by the timing of an EP election. The closer an EP election 
is held to a national election, the less likely exit and voice should be. The statistical model 
includes a variable measuring the length of the period between the preceding national election 
and the EP election divided by the overall length of the electoral cycle (cf. Reif 1984). A 
value of 0 indicates the date of the first national election, .5 is the exact midterm and 1 the 
date of the second national election. This cycle position is considered in its simple and 
squared form. The simple term represents the initial course of the cycle while the squared 
term determines the curve towards the end of the legislative period. 
The attractiveness of exit options available to voters is measured by two complementary 
variables. One of them derives from party positions on the 10-point left-right scales of the 
EES. First the absolute difference between a voter’s left-right self-assessment and her 
perception of each party’s position on the same scale is calculated. Then each voter is 
assigned her minimum (i.e. most attractive) value for a government party and for an 
opposition party. Finally the differential between these two measures is calculated and coded 
as to assign high values to promising exit options. This variable thus evaluates the most 
attractive exit option and controls for the level a voter could achieve without crossing the 
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 divide between government and opposition.
6 A value of 9 means exit is highly attractive, a 
value of -9 means it is highly unattractive. 
Whereas the left-right differential considers exit options in terms of ideological voting, the 
second measure of attractiveness is concerned with issue voting. In the EES, respondents are 
asked to name the most important problem facing their country (a question of saliency) and 
the party they think would be best at dealing with this problem (a question of competence). 
For government voters, a 3-point variable is created taking a value of 1 for an opposition 
party, -1 for a government party and 0 for no party mentioned. For opposition voters the 
pattern is reversed so that also this variable assigns high values to promising exit options and 
low values to an attractive supply in a voter’s previous political camp. 
Exit options could affect the likelihood of exit and voice in two different ways, depending 
on the role of threat discussed above. They could simply make exit more likely, but they 
could also be used to lend credibility to voice. Therefore the hypotheses for protest voting and 
conversion are theoretically indeterminate and need to be explored empirically. In contrast, 
the frequency of alienation should always be reduced by exit options because for these voters 
the overall attractiveness of the party system (and not of a particular party) is essential. 
As already established, loyalty is represented by party identification. The EES ask 
respondents to name a party they feel “close” to and to rate this closeness on a scale from 0 
(“not at all”) to 3 (“very close”). Government voters are assigned this rating if they mentioned 
a government party, opposition voters if they mentioned an opposition party. Loyalty to a 
party should make core voting and voice more and exit less likely. 
To measure expected influence on party behaviour, four EES items were considered that 
offer a detailed evaluation of voters’ beliefs in political efficacy and system responsiveness.
7 
                                                 
6 For those respondents who abstained (or intend to abstain) in all three elections, the reference party was 
identified by the highest PTV score. 
7 Respondents are asked to indicate their agreement with these statements on four-point scales: “Sometimes 
politics is so complicated that someone like me just cannot understand what is going on.” “Parties and politicians 
in <name of your country> are more concerned with fighting each other than with furthering the common 
interest.” “So many people vote in elections that my vote does not matter.” “Most of the parties in <name of your 
country> are so much alike that it does not make much of a difference which one is in government.” These items 
are only included in the EES for 1999, so missing values for 2004 were estimated on the basis of the 1999 data 
by multiple imputation (see fn. 4). Admittedly this solution is less than optimal, so two contextual indicators 
were used to verify its robustness: the Voice & Accountability Index by the World Bank, and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index by Transparency International. The main conclusions of the paper remained unaffected when 
these variables were used. Still, the survey-based measure is preferred because the task is to test a micro-theory 
of behaviour that depends on individual perceptions. 
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 The items clearly vary in “difficulty”, so I applied polytomous Mokken scaling to explore the 
underlying structure (cf. Mokken 1971; Hemker, Sijtsma & Molenaar 1995; Hardouin 2007). 
This procedure identified a latent dimension of (external) efficacy composed of two items: 
“My own vote does not matter” and “It does not matter which party is in government”. An 
additive scale with a range from 0 to 6 was generated. The coding was inverted so that high 
values on this variable correspond to high expected influence and should be associated with 
more voice and less exit.
8 
In addition to the EVL variables, three controls are considered: age, education, and 
formerly communist countries. All these variables should be related to the likelihood of 
defection. The older voters are, the more likely it is that they already found a party to support 
in the long run and the less likely they are to be converted or alienated (cf. Franklin 2004). Of 
course they may very well be in a state of permanent alienation, but this does not concern EP 
elections in particular and does not affect the model. Older voters should also be more likely 
to voice because they dispose of the political experience required for this sophisticated two-
level strategy. In the same vein, education (as measured by the age when respondents stopped 
full-time education) is supposed to make voice more and exit less likely. Finally, post-
communist countries should exhibit less core voting and voice and more exit. Relatively high 
levels of party system volatility complicate orientation for voters, and the “art of voice” 
(Hirschman 1970: 43) has had less time to evolve. 
Table 2 summarises the concepts, variables and hypotheses of my model. Descriptive 
statistics are available in the Appendix. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Constructing the dependent variable 
 
Behaviour 
To test the EVL model, respondents in the EES must first be allocated to the various voter 
types. This can be done on the basis of three survey items concerning voting behaviour: 
reported vote choice in the EP election (EPE), reported vote choice in the previous national 
                                                 
8 Traces of a similar effect can be found in previous research. Marsh (1998) shows that the second-order effect 
against governing parties is higher in countries where election results are linked to alternation in government. 
Voters who expect alternation as a reaction to changing vote shares would face higher incentives for voice. 
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 election (NE1), and vote intention in a hypothetical national election the day after the 
interviews (NE2). Differences between reported EPE behaviour and intended NE2 behaviour 
are usually referred to as “quasi-switching” (Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996; Van Egmond 
2007). I adopt this concept and augment it with reported behaviour from NE1. 
It should be noted that for all voter types change and stability are evaluated at the level of 
government and opposition. Movement within these camps is not considered. This 
specification derives from our interest in the two main phenomena of the second-order model 
that are united by the EVL approach: government losses and low turnout. The choices I will 
model are thus between government, opposition, and abstention. 
Core voters typically support the same camp (government or opposition) in three elections 
in a row. Moreover, mobilisation of former non-voters from NE1 is considered if EPE and 
NE2 correspond. This is necessary from a logical point of view because parties’ core support 
is in continuous flux at the margins, i.e. involving both outflow and inflow of voters. 
Protest voters exercise voice by abstaining or by switching parties in EPE. Usually these 
voters join the same camp in NE1 and NE2, but abstention in one of the two national elections 
is allowed if the other one indicates a reference party that voice is targeted at. Abstention in 
NE1 would imply that a voter has made up her mind only recently; abstention in NE2 reflects 
that a voter may want to postpone her decision until potential effects of her voice occur. 
Converts are supposed to abandon their NE1 camp in the long run. Either they defect in 
EPE or they delay this decision until NE2. In the latter case, abstention in EPE may serve to 
minimise psychological costs involved in defection. But since conversion is defined as the 
combination of exit and turnout (see Table 1), participation in NE1 and NE2 is essential. 
Alienated voters must report long-run abstention in EPE and NE2 but participation in NE1. 
As second-order effects are about differences between national and EP elections, only the 
process of becoming alienated – but not the state of being alienated – is of interest. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
As  Table 3 shows, three out of four voter types can be identified on the basis of 
behavioural criteria. However, identifying protest voters is more demanding. In the case of 
vote switching we have to make sure that the EPE party is indeed less preferred. And in the 
case of abstention we have to make sure that the underlying motive is related to the first-order 
arena and not to the second-order one. I will address these problems in turn. 
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 Utility 
Reif & Schmitt (1980) suggest two possible motives in the case of vote switching in EPE. 
One of them is voice; the other one is strategic voting in NE1 and NE2 but sincere voting in 
EPE, called “voting with the heart” by Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996). For such a voter EP 
elections are a welcome opportunity to support her preferred party at the polls. In national 
elections, however, she casts her ballot strategically as to maximise its impact on government 
formation. Consequently, large parties are expected to suffer from this form of behaviour in 
EP elections. To separate this effect from the dynamics stemming from the difference 
between government and opposition, we need to go beyond behavioural criteria and address 
voters’ strategic motives themselves. 
Detecting strategic voting behaviour has always been a challenge for electoral research. 
Arguably the best-known solution dates back to Converse (1966) who introduced the concept 
of a “normal vote”. Voters behave “normally” if they support the party they feel close to, 
whereas strategic voters contravene this basic principle of party identification. The focus on 
the popular party ID variable allows for a straightforward empirical test that was applied in 
EP elections research by Heath et al. (1996) to distinguish protest voters from converts. 
Despite its use for earlier studies, however, party ID is problematic as a measure of the 
“normal vote” for two reasons. First, trends of electoral dealignment challenge the prevalence 
of party ID in Western electorates (e.g. Dalton & Wattenberg 2001). If a voter does not feel 
close to any party, the ID-based method fails inevitably, although the voter may still choose 
between sincere and strategic behaviour. Second, the level of generalisation of party ID as a 
theoretical concept is not high enough to justify its prominent role. In the Michigan model of 
vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960) that generated the “normal vote” concept, party ID 
competes against a set of other predictors of voting. An “abnormal” vote measured by party 
ID is not associated necessarily with strategic behaviour but may simply reflect the influence 
of a more short-term but still sincere element of the vote function (cf. Anker 1992). 
While retaining the basic logic of the “normal vote”, Cain (1978) replaced the ID variable 
by “sympathy scores”, a highly generalised evaluation of parties obtained from all voters. 
Rosema (2006) provides further evidence that evaluation scales are superior to party ID to 
detect strategic voting in parliamentary democracies. With the “propensities to vote” (PTVs), 
the EES contain similar measures. Although these items ask literally for the probability a 
respondent will ever vote for a particular party, they are designed to measure the Downsian 
(1957) utility a voter expects from supporting a party (Tillie 1995; Van der Eijk et al. 2006). 
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 Ranging on a scale from 1 to 10 for each party in the dataset, the PTVs encompass even very 
differentiated utility patterns that may arise in multi-party systems. 
As rational voters are supposed to maximise expected utility, a sincere vote means 
consistency of reported behaviour with the preference order established by the PTVs. Blais, 
Young & Turcotte (2005) show that such a “direct” approach to strategic voting (i.e. 
comparing behaviour to preferences) is especially useful to our task of identifying particular 
strategic voters. Whereas more “indirect” (model-based) approaches do not necessarily 
perform worse on the aggregate level, the uncertainty involved in predicting vote choice 
complicates individual-level analysis. Combining strategic voting with other criteria in my 
typology requires unambiguous decisions. 
In the second-order context, sincere and strategic voting can be distinguished on the basis 
of the PTV score of a voter’s EPE party and the score of the reference party as indicated by 
intended behaviour in NE2 (or, if this value is missing, by reported behaviour in NE1). Protest 
voters deliberately cast a vote for a lower-scoring party in EPE to signal their dissatisfaction 
to their higher-scoring party from NE2 (see the right column in Table 3). In contrast, “voting 
with the heart” would imply the choice of a higher-scoring party in EPE than in NE2.
9 
Before this coding scheme can be implemented, one more issue must be dealt with. As yet 
I have assumed that the PTVs reflect only sincere aspects of party evaluation. However, Van 
der Eijk & Franklin (1996) established that the PTV measure itself also takes certain strategic 
considerations into account. With the PTVs representing the utility expected from voting for a 
party, large parties with a high capacity to implement their policies should achieve higher 
scores owing to their sheer electoral size. This would lead us to mistake some of the “voting 
with the heart” for “voting with the boot”. To counteract such distortion, I estimated the effect 
of electoral strength on the PTVs empirically and adjusted the PTV values accordingly.
10 
 
                                                 
9 For both types, what matters is the relation between the two PTV scores, not the relation to the maximum PTV 
(even if the two usually coincide). This specification stems from the focus of second-order theory on differences 
between EP and national elections; general levels of strategic voting across elections are not of interest. 
10 The PTVs were employed as the dependent variable of a linear regression model in a stacked data matrix (cf. 
Van der Eijk et al. 2006). Predictors included party-voter distances on scales of left-right ideology and support 
for European integration, party ID, issue saliency, government approval, age, gender, class, religiosity, and 
finally vote share in NE1. The coefficient of the size variable was estimated at a highly significant 3.513, i.e. 
changing the vote share of a party from 0% to 100% would increase its average PTV score by 3.513 points, all 
else equal. Thus, the product of this coefficient with vote share was subtracted from each party’s PTV scores. 
This procedure takes account of the nature of the PTV measure as developed in the literature, even if the 
implications for the findings of this paper are minor. 
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 Attitudes 
Another complication arises when voice is exercised by abstention in EPE. On the basis of 
this behaviour alone, it is impossible to distinguish voice aimed at the national arena from 
abstention due to (negative) attitudes towards the European arena itself. Admittedly, the latter 
possibility may be considered at odds with the basic assumption of second-order research that 
issues of European integration do not matter for voting behaviour. However, the original 
framework by Reif & Schmitt (1980: 10ff.) does include arena-specific factors influencing the 
outcome of EP elections. In this vein, Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson (1998) report quite a 
number of EU-related motives for abstention revealed by means of open-ended questions. 
To make sure that voice in EP elections in not confounded with EU-related effects on 
turnout, I draw on two criteria. First, protest voters who abstain in EPE must not show lower 
satisfaction with democracy in the EU compared to democracy in their home country. 
Equivalently, they must not indicate lower interest in EU politics (equated with interest in the 
preceding election campaign) compared to national politics (equated with general interest in 
politics). If one or both of these relative criteria are violated, there is reason to believe that the 
nation-specific scores are sufficient to make voters participate in NE1 and NE2 whereas the 
lower EU-specific scores provoke abstention in EPE. 
To some these criteria may seem overly strict, given that
 disinterest or dissatisfaction do 
not categorically rule out other motives. Moreover, Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson’s (1998) 
results were challenged on methodological grounds by Schmitt & Van der Eijk (2007). 
However, “European” effects on turnout also appeared in several recent studies (Flickinger & 
Studlar 2007; Wessels 2007; Fauvelle-Aymar & Stegmaier 2008; Hobolt, Spoon & Tilley 
2009). But this is not the place to settle this debate. For my analysis, it is merely important to 
safeguard the operationalisation of voice. In anticipation of the following descriptive results it 
is worth pointing out that the effects of this strategy are purely conservative: relaxing one or 
both of the turnout criteria would reinforce the prominence of voice against opposition parties 
and corroborate the conclusions drawn from the evidence at large. 
 
 
Descriptive results 
 
Based on the criteria set out above, the size of the various groups in the EES datasets for 1999 
and 2004 can now be determined. We will first look at results from the pooled data and then 
attempt to model cross-country variation. Table 4 shows the percentage of the electorate for 
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 each voter type, differentiated by government and opposition.
11 Note that core voters support 
the respective camp, whereas all the other types defect from it. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Comparing the groups for government and opposition yields a surprise: The “usual 
suspects” from the second-order elections literature, strategic protest voters, do not contribute 
to government losses in EP elections. Certainly voice is a widespread phenomenon, being 
second only to core voting, but it does not turn against government parties in particular. Quite 
the contrary, opposition parties suffer more from protest voting in EP elections. But why do 
government parties lose if not from voice? As evident from Table 4, government losses are 
induced by exit through conversion and alienation. As a correlate, core voting for government 
parties is considerably less frequent than for opposition parties. 
The message of these findings is clear: In contrast to voice, exit reflects processes of 
sincere preference change with regard to parties and party systems. Obviously defection from 
opposition parties remains at the protest level whereas defection from government parties 
passes quickly into radical, long-term reorientation. In this respect, EP elections seem to have 
many aspects beyond being just second-order protest events. 
The results also contribute to an ongoing debate whether vote losses in EP elections are 
related to government status or to party size (e.g. Ferrara & Weishaupt 2004; Kousser 2004; 
Marsh 2005; Koepke & Ringe 2006; Hix & Marsh 2007). The usual assumption is that 
governments lose due to strategic voting in EP elections (“voting with the boot”), and large 
parties lose due to strategic voting in national election (“voting with the heart”). My findings 
do not discredit the latter hypothesis – party size may well matter in addition to the factors 
discussed here – but they do reject attempts to subsume government losses under the size 
effect. Incumbency matters per se, and unlike usually assumed the underlying process seems 
to be about changing preferences, not about strategy. 
Certainly one might suspect artefacts of technical specifications behind these relatively 
novel results. Two characteristics of the typology make this unlikely. First, the typology 
accounts for defection from both government and opposition (with the latter usually being 
                                                 
11 Percentages could also be specified in relation to support in NE1 to account for the higher calculation base for 
governing parties. However, the difference between government and opposition is less than 1% of the electorate 
so this additional complication can be safely ignored. Two groups of voters had to be omitted from the 
calculation base for reasons of missing data: voters who were too young to vote in the previous national election 
(NE1 is missing), and voters who support very small parties not included in the EES (required PTV is missing). 
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 neglected in EP elections research). Potential data deficits or changes of the operationalisation 
would necessarily concern respondents in both political camps: absolute values may diverge 
slightly, but the relative values that determine government losses are independent of this 
variation. Second, voter motives are jointly determined by measures of behaviour, utility and 
attitudes. Manipulating an individual criterion is therefore unlikely to affect the ratio of 
strategically and sincerely motivated voters. Overall, the typology gains considerable 
robustness from these built-in safety mechanisms.
12 
The success of the typology is also reflected in its coverage. The behaviour of more than 
60% of eligible voters can be interpreted by a single theory. The remaining 40% that do not 
fulfil the criteria for any of the EVL types make up a very heterogeneous group: some never 
vote, some may abstain for reasons related to the European arena, others may be indifferent 
between parties, and again others may “vote with the heart”. The aim of my research design is 
not to isolate such additional types. However, it should be noted that these voters still had the 
opportunity to behave in one of the ways covered by the EVL model, even if they finally 
decided differently. In the following multinomial analysis they will therefore not be dropped 
but included in the base category. 
 
 
Testing the model 
 
Method 
An adequate test of the EVL model should allow individuals to choose between core voting, 
voice and the two forms of exit in EP elections. Multinomial estimation of this model is 
complicated by the fact that not all respondents dispose of all options. Both forms of exit 
require that the respective respondent participated in NE1 (cf. Table 3). Non-voters from this 
election are ineligible for exit because exit is defined as a process, not as a state. Moreover, 
government voters from NE1 by definition cannot exit from or use voice against opposition 
parties or even make up their core support. The same applies for opposition voters from NE1 
in relation to governing parties. To pass this logical information on to the statistical level, the 
                                                 
12 This way of cross-validation also helps to control for possible dynamics over time. For example, the PTV 
score a voter assigns to a party at the time of the EP elections may not reflect the exact value she would have 
assigned to the same party in the preceding national election. However, reported behaviour indicates the voter’s 
(former) support for either government or opposition in an unambiguous way. This is not to say the data are free 
from recall bias, but any such distortion would mainly suppress the extent of exit (and especially exit from 
government parties). If anything, the figures in Table 4 can be considered conservative. 
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 model is estimated by multinomial conditional logistic regression. This allows to manipulate 
the set of alternatives available to each respondent according to her behaviour in NE1.
13 
As mentioned above, the base category consists of all voters not assigned to one of the four 
alternatives. Note, however, that the usual complications of interpreting multinomial results 
that are relative to a base category can be ignored. This is because we will not look at logit 
coefficients or odds ratios (which are hard to interpret) but at marginal effects on probabilities 
(i.e. partial derivatives or slopes). Formally this is the ratio of the change in the probability of 
a certain outcome to the change in a regressor where the latter value tends to 0 and all other 
variables are held at their mean values. These estimates were obtained by averaging over 
10,000 simulations drawn from the multivariate normal distribution. To facilitate direct 
comparison all variables were rescaled to a range of 0 to 1 (see Appendix). 
Another important issue concerns the multi-level structure of the data. The model is based 
on surveys from 23 countries (with 12 of them in both 1999 and 2004). Pooling these surveys 
gives us leverage in two ways: First, cross-sectional data from countries at different times 
during their legislative periods can be used to estimate cyclical effects in voting behaviour, a 
task that would otherwise require an enormous time series. And second, the choices of voter 
types can be modelled that would be represented by too few individuals in single-country 
surveys. However, both aspects also entail potential complications: effects of individual-level 
variables may differ across countries in general, and the estimation of political cycles may be 
sensitive to country-specific factors in particular (cf. Van der Eijk 1987). 
Hierarchical linear modelling allows to address both issues of higher-level variance. I used 
the -gllamm- algorithm in Stata (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008) to estimate multiple 
random effects for the multinomial conditional logistic model. Preliminary results of this 
extremely demanding procedure corroborated the findings reported below. More precise 
estimation, however, was computationally infeasible. In order not to neglect the multi-level 
structure of the data, I will treat it as a nuisance by adjusting the statistical uncertainty of the 
estimates. This is achieved by reporting cluster-robust standard errors at the election level.
14 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives imposed by logistic regression may be considered 
inappropriate in this case. However, multinomial conditional probit regression as the standard solution to this 
problem failed to converge. Comparing unconditional logit and probit did not suggest meaningful differences. 
14 Alternatively, jackknife estimation was used to verify robustness at the level of election clusters. 
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 Results 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents the results. To begin with, the cycle variables behave as expected. The 
timing of an EP election in the national electoral cycle clearly affects the dynamics of EVL. 
To interpret these patterns correctly, one should bear in mind that the marginal effects were 
calculated with all other variables held at their means. In case of the two cycle variables the 
results may be misleading because the squared term is a function of the simple term; the two 
cannot vary independently of each other. Figure 1 displays the influence of the electoral cycle 
in a more informative way by plotting its combined effect over all possible values. The curves 
represent predicted probabilities, and different shades of grey indicate significance levels of 
the marginal effect. Thus, a dark line means that for the respective outcome the rate of change 
of the probability (not the probability itself) is significantly different from zero at this point. 
The effects on core voting are interpreted most easily. Core voting is least likely at 
midterm and most likely at election time in the nation states. The effect is stronger for the 
government (and not quite significant for the opposition) and thus accounts for the cyclical 
losses governing parties suffer in EP elections. But what happens to former core voters at 
midterm? Exit plays its expected role: at midterm voters are more likely to get converted or 
alienated, and the exit cycle is more pronounced for governing parties. The anti-government 
swing cannot only be traced back to the higher frequency of conversion and alienation (what 
would be sufficient) but also to the more distinct functional form. In other words, the 
regression results show that the descriptive differences between exit from government and 
opposition (cf. Table 4) mainly occur during the midterm but not at election time. 
The graphs also reveal that alienation of government voters is not fully reversed over time 
and presumably harms governing parties even in NE2. We thus have an explanation not only 
of government losses in EP elections, but also of the general “cost of ruling” incurring in first-
order elections (cf. Nannestad & Paldam 2002). Whereas high levels of conversion seem to be 
unique to the second-order arena, the consequences of alienation spill over into the first-order 
arena. This provides a substantive interpretation of Marsh’s (1998) finding that EP election 
results affect party performance in subsequent national elections. A more general derivative is 
that especially the government’s inability to mobilise its voters during the midterm 
contributes to the decline of turnout in Western democracies. One could even speculate that 
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 by adding a low-stimulus event to the electoral calendar, EP elections actually reinforce 
trends towards alienation more generally (Franklin 2007). 
The most striking finding, however, concerns the role of voice. Voice against opposition 
parties follows the expected cyclical trend, but the same is not true for governing parties. 
Rather, voice against the government is fairly evenly distributed through the electoral cycle 
and does not seem to be conditioned by the timing of an EP election. In general governing 
parties are not targeted by voice any more than opposition parties (quite the contrary), and the 
absence of any midterm-swing further discredits the assumption of a strong link between 
protest voting and typical second-order effects. I will return to this puzzle below. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Turning to the individual-level variables, loyalty to a party renders core voting more and 
exit less likely, thus stabilising voting behaviour over time. Apparently motives for permanent 
change cannot be absorbed if loyalty is absent. We also find the expected positive effect of 
loyalty on voice. Long-term attachment to a party seems to motivate voters to fight short-term 
lapses by exercising voice. Thus, loyalty does not only attenuate the effects of pure market 
forces, it also helps to transform dissatisfaction with politics into political engagement. 
Concerning the role of exit options, the issue-based variable shows similar effects for 
government and opposition. Attractive exit options encourage exit and discourage voice. This 
provides a decision between the competing hypotheses on protest voting and conversion. 
Voters choose to exit when faced with a promising option, but they do not often use exit 
options to lend credibility to their voice. Voice rather seems to be a desperate attempt of 
voters who have “nowhere else to go” (Hirschman 1970: 65). The ideology-based variable 
behaves somewhat differently. For opposition voters, attractive alternatives on the left-right 
dimension still discourage voice, but for government voters the effect is reversed. In this 
respect voters indeed seem to favour voice when it is backed by credible exit options. Voice 
against governing parties is not only about conveying information, it is also about threat. 
The effect of exit options on alienation is also noteworthy. Although any reasonably 
attractive party should keep a voter from permanent abstention, we find the opposite. 
Arguably, cross-pressures are at work (cf. Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet 1944). If voters 
learn that a party other than the one they supported traditionally is better able to deal with 
their concerns, they may evade this problem of cognitive dissonance by abstaining. Rather 
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 than a profound aversion to all the individual parties, this logic suggests a state of “confusion” 
about the organisation of the whole party system that emerges mainly during the midterm. 
Traces of alienation do show up in the effect of efficacy. Exit from the party system is 
associated with low values on this variable. If voters expect parties to take their preferences 
into account, they are more likely to turn out and articulate their concerns; but if voters regard 
parties as categorically irresponsive, they cease to participate in democratic affairs. Whereas 
this systemic logic functions quite well, the party-level hypotheses do not hold. Efficacy 
should further protest voting at the expense of conversion because high expectations of 
influencing party behaviour raise both the likely payoff of voice and the opportunity costs of 
exit. However, neither conversion nor protest voting appear to be significantly affected. In 
this respect there is no evidence for strategic voting behaviour in EP elections. 
As for the control variables, we find several expected effects. There is less core voting and 
more alienation in post-communist countries, and older voters are less likely to abandon their 
parties. However, the effects on voice run counter to our expectations. Voice is more likely 
among young, uneducated and Eastern European voters. Political experience does not seem to 
characterise this voter type. But rather than calling the role of experience into question, these 
findings cast doubt on the nature of voice itself. Again, there is reason to conclude that protest 
voting in EP elections is not as strategic as often assumed. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The model generally achieves remarkable performance with regard to the determinants of 
sincere voting. Exit in the form of conversion and alienation follows the electoral cycle and 
reacts to the incentives postulated by the EVL framework. In contrast, the hypotheses on 
voice through strategic protest voting do not contribute much to our empirical insights into the 
dynamics of EP elections. Protest does not harm government parties in particular; voters 
rather do not use attractive exit options to apply pressure on their parties but they choose to 
exit once it pays off; expected influence on party behaviour does not lead to vital articulation 
of voice but rather to acquiescence or stable support; political experience does not seem to be 
required to redefine a low-stake election as an occasion to assert long-term interests. 
All this points to one conclusion: EP elections are also protest events, this I do not doubt, 
but this protest seems to be largely free from strategic considerations. Voters use second-order 
elections to document political dissatisfaction, but they do not understand this act as an 
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 attempt to bring about political change. Rather, their behaviour reminds of the concept of 
“expressive voting” put forward by Brennan & Lomasky (1993). In a nutshell, protest is about 
punishment, not about strategy. In this respect, it does not differ categorically from the other 
types of voting behaviour that contribute to the second-order effect, i.e. conversion and 
alienation. All these phenomena seem to reflect sincere motives, and protest voting may be 
best understood as a pre-stage to more radical change. Voters remain at this stage if 
dissatisfaction is limited, no attractive exit option is available, or loyalty keeps them from 
defecting. Otherwise, radical preference change prevails. 
Voice in EP elections does not only seem to be less sophisticated than commonly assumed, 
it is also less effective. Hirschman (1970: 26f.) argued that intense competition in an 
economic market – unlike commonly assumed – may reduce the overall quality provided by 
firms. Even if dissatisfied customers frequently choose exit, these movements may cancel 
each other out across firms and the management never learns about its lapses. Moreover, exit 
may “atrophy the development of the art of voice” because a firm constantly loses its most 
critical customers (ibid.: 43). In the case of elections where voice takes on the form of exit, a 
similar argument applies to protest voting. As we have seen above, protest does not affect 
government parties in particular. In the aggregate, voice fades away unheard.
15 The same does 
not apply to exit where the difference between government and opposition is clearly visible. 
Exit, not voice, therefore signals dissatisfaction most effectively.
16 In the case of elections the 
mere availability of low-cost voice may well atrophy the development of the art of exit. 
There is even evidence that parties react to growing dissatisfaction. The cyclical 
development of exit suggests a trend towards changing alignments during the midterm (also 
see Miller, Tagg & Britto 1986). At the time of an EP election, converts and alienated voters 
do not intend to return to their old parties. For some of them second-order elections serve as a 
trigger to enter new alliances or to turn away from politics altogether. But others will change 
their minds and switch back. In fact, such behaviour would be expected on the basis of the 
downturn towards the end of the cycle. After a period of disarray, parties seem to respond and 
upcoming national elections restore order (cf. Franklin & Weber forthcoming). Moreover, the 
even distribution of protest voting against governing parties through the cycle suggests a 
transitional status between core voting and exit. Then, all types of voting behaviour, including 
voice, seem to react to the same stimulus that is simply stronger for the government 
                                                 
15 An exception may be the sporadic success of extremist and/or eurosceptic parties in EP elections. 
16 Hence proposals to strengthen the role of voice in elections through deliberative procedures (Gastil 2000). 
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 (provoking more frequent and radical preference change) and weaker for the opposition 
(restricting defection to the protest level). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At first sight, Hirschman’s “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” is hardly impressive. It simply tells us 
what people do when they are dissatisfied with a social situation – do they complain or do 
they leave? At second sight, however, the theory develops the kind of complexity that unites 
all sorts of social phenomena. Adapting EVL for the study of voting behaviour proved 
feasible and fruitful alike. 
The empirical application has produced novel insights into the dynamics at work in 
second-order elections. EP elections do not seem to be prime venues for strategic protest. 
Instead, more fundamental processes of de- and realignment seem to take place. These results 
feed back into theoretical debates about EVL. Interpreting vote choice as exit or voice 
highlights the importance of distinguishing between behaviour and motives to explain 
reactions to dissatisfaction, and the cyclical course of EVL dynamics reflects the need to 
incorporate supply-side factors into behavioural models. 
Opportunities for further research are numerous. First, I have modelled electoral dynamics 
between government and opposition, but not within these camps. Second, I have analysed the 
second-order impact of incumbency, but not of party size. Third, I have explained behaviour 
of voters who fit within the EVL framework, but the typology is not exhaustive. And fourth, 
the model is still rudimentary with regard to supply-side dynamics of party strategy. 
The various issues I do have addressed suggest that voters’ potentials to govern the 
outcome and implications of EP elections have been traditionally overrated. In contrast, 
claims of the strategic capacities of parties have been rather modest in second-order elections 
research (but see Tóka 2007; Weber 2009). Especially government parties are supposed to be 
caught in a protest trap. But do parties really resign to their “European” fate, or do they follow 
strategies that require them to subordinate EP elections to other goals? Protest, preference 
change and electoral cycles do not appear from nowhere, and the ultimate answer may lie in 
the logic of party competition rather than in the logic of voting behaviour. 
Studies in management like Spencer (1986) and Cannings (1989) found that firms provide 
their employees with opportunities for voice in order to deter exit and to foster loyalty to an 
accessible organisation. Probably I am pushing the analogy too far by suggesting that political 
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 parties provide voters with second-order elections for similar reasons – preventing 
realignment and demonstrating responsiveness in first-order elections. But whatever the 
underlying mechanism, it seems to work concerning the latter effect, while concerning the 
former one we observe exactly the opposite: EP elections are an occasion for long-term 
change rather than for short-term strategy. 
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 Table 1   Exit and voice in voting behaviour 
    
  Turnout Abstention 
    
Voice  Protest voting  Voice-by-silence 
    
Exit  Conversion Alienation 
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 Table 2   A hypothetical model of EVL in EP elections 
Concept  Variable  Core  Voice  Exit (party)  Exit (system) 
          
Simple term  –  +  +  +  Electoral cycle  Squared term  +  –  –  – 
          
Left-right differential  –  +/–  –/+  –  Exit option  Issue competence  –  +/–  –/+  – 
          
Loyalty Party  ID  +  +  – – 
          
Expected influence  Efficacy  +  +  –  – 
          
Age +  +  –  – 
Education +  +  –  –  Control variables 
Post-communist country  –  –  +  + 
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 Table 3   Behavioural options in EP elections 
Type NE1  EPE  NE2  Qualification  criteria 
        
Gov Gov Gov    Core voting  abstention Gov  Gov   
        
        
Gov Opp Gov  PTVgov > PTVopp 
Gov abstention Gov  INTeu ≥ INTgen & SATeu ≥ SATnat 
Gov Opp  abstention PTVgov > PTVopp 
abstention Opp  Gov  PTVgov > PTVopp 
abstention abstention Gov  INTeu ≥ INTgen & SATeu ≥ SATnat 
 
 
Voice 
(protest voting) 
abstention Opp abstention PTVmax(gov) > PTVopp 
        
        
Gov Opp Opp    Exit from party 
(conversion) Gov  abstention Opp   
        
        
Exit from system 
(alienation)  Gov abstention abstention  
        
Key: Gov – government; Opp – opposition; NE1 – preceding national election; NE2 – following (hypothetical) 
national election; EPE – European Parliament election; PTV – propensity to vote; INT – political interest; SAT – 
satisfaction with democracy; eu – European; nat – national; gen – general; max – maximum. 
Vote choices apply for government parties. Switch “Gov” and “Opp” to obtain the table for opposition parties. 
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 Table 4   Empirical relevance of the voter types 
Type Government  Opposition  Total 
    
Core voting  15.11  19.74  34.85 
Voice 5.45  6.56  12.01 
Exit (from party)  4.08  1.38  5.46 
Exit (from system)  4.72  3.13  7.85 
      
Base category  39.83  39.83 
    
Total   100.00 
    
Figures represent percentages of the electorate. 
Source: Pooled dataset of the European Election Studies 1999 and 2004. 
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 Table 5   Behaviour in EP elections predicted from EVL variables 
  ------------------------- Governing parties -------------------------   ------------------------- Opposition parties ------------------------- 
  Core voting  Voice  Exit (party)  Exit (system) 
 
Core voting  Voice  Exit (party)  Exit (system) 
            
Cycle
 
                 
               
                 
               
               
                 
               
                 
               
                 
               
                 
               
                 
               
                 
               
                 
               
          
               
-.579*** -.046 .148*** .221* -.461* .234*** .086* .178**
(.188) (.071) (.051) (.125) (.260) (.072) (.046) (.086)
Cycle*Cycle
 
.546*** .030 -.128*** -.151 .431* -.233*** -.080* -.163**
(.169) (.062) (.046) (.108) (.233) (.072) (.041) (.082)
Exit option (left-right)
 
-.081  .099**  .154***  .181***  -.530***  -.094***  .040***  .021 
(.071) (.039) (.027) (.037) (.078) (.025) (.014) (.033)
Exit  option  (issues)
 
-.198*** -.049*** .089*** .114*** -.226*** -.038*** .045*** .066***
(.021) (.015) (.014) (.014) (.026) (.012) (.008) (.009)
Party  ID
 
.308*** .048*** -.114*** -.201*** .356*** .047*** -.039*** -.142***
(.023) (.013) (.014) (.023) (.033) (.015) (.008) (.017)
Efficacy
 
.106*** -.010 -.002 -.078*** .100*** -.017 .003 -.049***
(.019) (.013) (.008) (.018) (.024) (.011) (.005) (.013)
Age
 
.136*** -.035*** -.036*** -.047*** .134*** -.056*** -.021*** -.042**
(.028) (.013) (.009) (.018) (.024) (.014) (.008) (.018)
Education
 
.037 -.032 .018 -.081 .099 -.074* -.000 -.049
(.052) (.039) (.022) (.055) (.081) (.044) (.017) (.041)
Post-communist
 
-.066** .032*** .015 .042** -.130*** .040*** .007 .030***
(.033) (.010) (.009) (.018) (.035) (.011) (.008) (.008)
Constant
 
.030 -.061** -.144*** -.105** .278*** -.012 -.071*** -.039
(.065) (.030) (.023) (.041) (.091) (.027) (.018) (.031)
   N (options)  169685             Log pseudolikelihood  -39431           
   N (individuals)  33937             Pseudo R2  .279           
   N (elections) 
 
35             % correctly predicted 
   
55           
          
Marginal effects on probabilities from a multinomial conditional logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by election). 
Source: Pooled dataset of the European Election Studies 1999 and 2004. 
* significant at .1   ** significant at .05   *** significant at .01 
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 Figure 1   Predicted probabilities through the electoral cycle 
 
 
 
 
Note the differences in scaling. Curves are predicted probabilities. Different shades of grey indicate significance 
levels of the marginal effect: black – 99%; dark grey – 95%; grey – 90%; light grey – insignificant. 
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 Appendix: descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
        
Cycle 0.464  0.265  0  0.919 
Cycle squared  0.285  0.255  0  0.845 
Left-right differential  -1.010  2.470  -9  9 
     - rescaled  0.444  0.137  0  1 
Issue competence  -0.320  0.632  -1  1 
     - rescaled  0.340  0.316  0  1 
Party ID  0.721  0.954  0  3 
     - rescaled  0.240  0.318  0  1 
Efficacy 3.803  1.484  0  6 
     - rescaled  0.634  0.247  0  1 
Age 46.645  16.472  18  101 
     - rescaled  0.345  0.198  0  1 
Education 19.544  6.254  1  88 
     - rescaled  0.213  0.072  0  1 
Post-communist country  0.199  0.399  0  1 
        
The regression model in Table 5 uses the rescaled variables. 
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